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ADDRESSING COMPUTER CRIME
LEGISLATION: PROGRESS
AND REGRESS
Losses resulting from computer-related crimes' are estimated to2
be between $100 and $300 million annually in the United States.
For example, a large insurance company was recently the victim of
"electronic vandalism." After being fired, an irate woman strolled
through the computer room with a powerful electromagnet and
caused an estimated $10 million in damages to the system. 3 It is estimated that fewer than one percent of computer-related crimes are
ever detected. 4 Until recently, concerted efforts to prosecute such
crimes have been haphazard and ineffective, 5 in part due to the diffia criminal offense under existing federal and
culty in establishing
6
state statutes.
This Note discusses the deficiencies in existing legislation relating to computer crimes and presents an analytical framework to
evaluate legislation relating to computer abuse. Special focus is
placed on the statutory creation of a crime against intellectual prop7
erty and computer users under the Florida Computer Crimes-Act.
I. PROBLEMS PECULIAR TO COMPUTER CRIME
Before discussing deficiencies in existing criminal statutes, it is
necessary to review the most common methods of perpetrating com1. The definition of a computer-related abuse and its incidence have been the
subject of much debate. See, e.g., Parker, Computer Abuse Research Update, 2 CoMPUTER/LJ. 329 (1980); Taber, A Survey of Computer Crime Studies, 2 COMPUrER/L.J.
275 (1980). See also infra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
2. LA. Daily J., May 5, 1980, at 3, col. 2. The estimated average "take" per crime
is $430,000. See Rivlin, Computer Crime, 10 STUDENT LAw. 15-16 (1980).
3. Id. at 17, comment (A Gallimaufry of Computer Scams).
4. A. BEQUAI, COMPUTER CRIME xiii (1978).
5. See generally Coughran, Prosecution of Computer Abuse, 1 CRIM. JUST. J. 397
(1978); Ingraham, On Charging Computer Crime, 2 ComPTrrER/.,J. 429 (1980).
6. Sokolik, Computer Crime-The Need for Deterrent Legislation, 2 CoMPUTER/LJ. 353, 373 (1980). See Becker, The Trial of a Computer Crime, 2 COMPUTER/
LJ. 441, 445-49 (1980).
7. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 815.01-.07 (West Supp. 1982).
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puter crimes and to discuss a definitional framework for analyzing
computer crime.
A.

AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK

There is presently no agreement among commentators as to
what constitutes a "computer crime," and consequently, a universal
definition of computer crime is notably absent from the vocabulary
of current literature. In studies sponsored by the Stanford Research
Institute, Donn Parker carefully chose the term "computer abuse"
rather than "computer crime" to describe his work8 because his
studies analyze some abuses that do not involve criminal activities
as a court of law might define such behavior. 9 But, in response to
Parker's terminology, John Taber points out that such inconsistent
treatment causes confusion because many people interpret "abuse"
to mean crime.' 0
A more extreme definitional position is that computer crime
does not exist as a separate type of crime. This view is advanced by
Donald Ingraham, a Deputy District Attorney in California, who believes that computer crime is really nothing more than a variation
on an old theme and that there is only crime by computer, not computer crime." From Ingraham's perspective, unauthorized use of
processing time on a computer is more properly classified as theft;
manipulation of computerized data to cover up the pilferage of inventory is more properly classified as embezzlement, and "snooping" through computer files is more properly classified as invasion of
privacy.' 2 Some authors, therefore, discuss the subject in terms of
"computer-assisted" crime rather than in terms of computer crime
13
or abuse.
Computer abuse can be placed in one of five categories of currently recognized crime: financial crime, informational crime, theft
8. See Parker, supra note 1, at 333-35. Parker heads the Stanford Research Institute's program on the Study of Computer Abuses, a program sponsored by the National Science Foundation.
9. The Fourth Circuit has adopted the phrase "computer abuse" as a term of art.
See United States v. Jones, 553 F.2d 351, 353 n.6 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 968
(1977).
10. See Taber, supra note 1. John Taber is a systems programmer and an author
of articles on computer crime. For purposes of this Note, the term "computer abuse"
will be used because it is the most inclusive. See also Kling, Computer Abuse and
Computer Crime as OrganizationalActivities, 2 COMPUTER/L.J. 403, 407-08 (1980).
11. Ingraham, supra note 5, at 430-37. Ingraham is a former chairman of the Computer Abuse Subsection of the American Bar Association.
12. Id.
13. Schojlberg, Computer-Assisted Crime in Scandanavia, 2 COMPUTER/L.J. 457
(1980).
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of property, theft of services, and vandalism. A financial crime is the
taking of funds via computer, for example, executing the theft
through a system with a computer payroll. The informational crime,
one of the least detected and most expensive types of computer
crime, involves the acquisition of valuable information via computer,
information such as a company's mailing lists. A theft of property is
simply the taking of computer merchandise for personal sale or use.
A theft of services is the unauthorized use of a computer, for example, use of a company's computer for personal, nonofficial use. Finally, vandalism is intentional damage to a computer or computer
14
system, either by physical destruction or by altering the system.
Some computer abuse fits more easily into our traditional criminal statutory scheme, such as theft of physical computer property
and vandalism. Other types of abuse, such as the taking of information or services, are more difficult to analyze in traditional terms.
The above categorization is consonant with Ingraham's notion that
the computer is merely a tool to perpetrate age-old crimes or
15
abuses.
Another commentator on computer abuse, Susan Nycum, has
suggested a method for analyzing computer software abuses accord6
ing to the manner of misappropriation1 :
(1) misappropriation of software through the use of a remote
terminal 7 ;
(2) misappropriation of software through direct access to a computer center or software storage facility 18;
(a) unauthorized or fraudulent access by unprivileged users;
(b) unauthorized or fraudulent access to software by an employee or former employee;
(3) obliteration or bugging of software by inflicting physical damage19; and
14. Tunick, Computer Law: An Overview, 13 Loy. LA.L REV. 315, 328 (1980).
15. See supra note 5.
16. Nycum, The CriminalLaw Aspects of Computer Abuse, 5 RuT. J. COMPUTERS &
LAw 271, 276-94 (1976). Susan Nycum is a legal consultant to the Stanford Research
Institute's Study of Computer Abuses for the National Science Foundation.
17. Id. at 276-87. An individual who misappropriates software by using a remote
terminal could be prosecuted under a larceny or trade secret statute, and, if a credit
card is used to perpetrate the offense, an individual could be prosecuted under a false
pretenses statute. Id.
18. Id. at 287-91. This form of abuse is similar to the statutory crimes of vandalism or criminal mischief. Interference with computer use is difficult to prosecute unless there is physical damage to the computer. Some prosecutions in this area have
been successful through use of criminal tampering or trespass statutes.
19. D. PARKER, S. NYcuM & S. OuRA, COMPUTER ABUSE 79 (1973). As of 1978, over
two million people were operating approximately ninety thousand computers. See
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(4) miscellaneous abuses, such as, credit card abuse, for example.
This analysis draws attention to how the computer abuse is perpetrated and away from the resultant harm. It also reflects the fact
that there are five key points in a computer system through which
one can gain access to information: input, programming, the central
20
processing unit, output, and remote transmission.
In summary, although recognition of the type of harm caused by
the computer crime is important to the analysis of the computer
abuse problem, focus on how the abuse is committed is extremely
important. 2 1 It is essential that the courts and legislators realize
that the uniqueness of computer abuse lies in the many ways of
gaining access to the computer. Computer abuse can occur in unobtrusive ways, such as through fraudulent access or bugging of
software. Furthermore, detection is especially difficult since the unauthorized user often is someone very familiar with the computer
22
system.
B.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF CONVENTIONAL THEFT LAws

Criminal law has traditionally placed great emphasis on tangible thefts, yet many computer thefts occur without damaging the
computer or removing property. 23 The lack of criminal statutes specifically addressing computer theft may jeopardize prosecution of
24
such computer crimes.
1. The History of the Law of Theft
The history of the law of theft illuminates some of the reasons
why traditional criminal statutes, such as larceny, have been inadequate in prosecuting computer abuses. Generally, the entire law of
theft is a product of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 25 By
the middle of the nineteenth century, the laws of theft even covered
stealing a piece of paper, 26 though similar property interests, such
generally A. BEQUAI, supra note 4, at 4, 19-24 (discussing the need for personnel and
physical security).
20. Roddy, The Federal Computer Systems Protection Act, 7 RUTGERS J. COMPUTER TECH. & L. 343, 347 (1980). See Lahore, Computers and the Law: The Protection
of Intellectual Property, 9 FED. L. REV. 15 (1978).
21. Sokolik, supra note 6, at 364-65.
22. Id. at 365-66. See A. BEQUAI, supra note 4, at 28.
23. Volgyes, The Investigation, Prosecution, and Prevention of Computer Crime:
A State-of-the Art Review, 2 COMPtrrER/LJ. 385, 398 (1980).
24. See Ingraham, supra note 5.
25. J. HALL, THEFT, LAw AND SOCIETY 34-36 (1935).
26. Regina v. Perry, 1 Carr & Kir. 725 (1848); J.F. STEPHENS, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 75 (1950).
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as choses in action, realty, and electricity, 27 had previously been
considered objects incapable of being stolen.
Before the 1850's, the most significant impact on the law of theft
was the Carrier'sCase in 1473.28 In this case, the court recognized
the ability of a bailee to "trespass" on the goods of his bailor. Until
that time, the court had found that, for legal purposes, a bailee was
considered to be "in possession" of the bailor's goods, and therefore
was incapable of stealing from himself. By refinement of the Carrier's Case, a series of acts that had been civil wrongs were admitted
into the law of larceny. 29 With the advent of large scale marketing
and purchase of goods, safeguards against fraud became necessary. 30 The last twenty years of the eighteenth century produced
the most rapid and extensive growth of the entire law of theft. This
growth of the theft doctrine survived in American courts. An early
case, Missouri v. McLaughlin,31 permitted a voter's referendum to
be the object of theft, thus extending the law of theft to cover written instruments. The court, however, qualified its decision by stating that the referendum contained valuable signatures.
The historical development of the crime of theft reflects the
economic flux of the nation's history. Change in the law has been
relatively recent and tends to follow rather than lead economic development within the country. Steadfastly implanted in the law of
theft is the notion that property capable of being stolen must be tan32
gible and that such property must physically change possession.
It becomes difficult, therefore, to apply the common law and
statutes based upon the law of theft when faced with the unique elements of computer abuse. For example, to be guilty of the crime of
"stealing," according to Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, one must
"without the consent of the owner, fraudulently and without claim
of right made in good faith, tak[e] and carr[y] away anything capable of being stolen with intent, at the time of such taking, perma-

nently to deprive the owner thereof.

.

. .33

Included in this

definition is an explanation of things capable of being stolen, that is,
"[e]verything which has value and is the property of any person,
and if adhering to the realty then after severance therefrom, is capa27. A. WILSHIRE, HARRIS' CImiNAL LAw 190 (14th ed. 1926).
28. J. HALL, supra note 25, at 315-46.
29. Id. at 6.
30. Id. at 24-33.
31. 3 H.C.L. 144 (1919).
32. G. WnAuAs, TEXTBOOK OF CRImiNAL LAW 676-89 (1978).
33. J. STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF CRIMINAL LAw 302 (7th ed. 1950). Sir James
Fitzjames Stephen was a notable British author and attorney who specialized in
criminal law. His books contain some of the first coherent definitions in criminal law.

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. IV

ble of being stolen .... "34 Further, Stephen states that "[i]f the
thing taken and carried away is for the first time made capable of
being stolen by the act of taking and carrying away, and if the taking
and carrying away is one continuous act, such taking and carrying
away is not stealing unless it is provided that it should be."'35 Therefore, under Stephen's analysis, if nothing is physically removed
from the computer premises, or if the computer item is not actually
taken and carried away from the premises, 36 such as in the case of
stealing the use of a computer terminal, then this law is difficult to
apply.
37
The tangibility issue was addressed in Ward v. Superior Court.
The court found that the defendant had not stolen an "article"
within the meaning of the penal code because implicit in the definition of the article is that it must be something 38tangible. The court
found that electronic impulses are not tangible.
Valuation of the item is necessary in order to distinguish a felony offense from a misdemeanor offense, and consequently, to determine the respective penalties. If some piece of the computer
program or system is actually stolen, valuation of what was stolen is
difficult. Is it the price of the paper on which the program was written, or is it the value of the bit of information to the company or the
39
owner of the program?
A recent case illustrates the problem of inadequate criminal
statutes. In United States v. Siedlitz, 4° an individual used a telephone to gain access to a former employer's computer and thereby
obtained a valuable and confidential program. United States attorneys in Maryland and Virginia, attempting to prosecute the theft,
encountered difficulty in using the federal statute prohibiting interstate transportation of stolen property. Not only was the statute unclear about whether the electronic impulses were property within
the requirements of the statute, but furthermore, the movement of
magnetic impulses from the victim's computer to the defendant's
computer did not satisfy the traditional interpretation of "stealing"
34. Id. at 306.
35. Id. at 309.
36. A. BEQUAI, supra note 4, at 28-29.
37. Ward v. Superior Ct., 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 206 (Cal. Sup. Ct.
1972).
38. Id. at 208.
39. The Fifth Circuit has rejected the argument that a stolen computer program
has ascertainable value only as paper. See Hancock v. Decker, 379 F.2d 552 (5th Cir.
1967).
40. 589 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1978).
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or "taking" of property as required by the statute. 4 1 Although Siedlitz was acquitted of the charge under the statute, he was convicted
of wire fraud for using interstate phone signals in the fraud. Siedlitz
demonstrates the complications that exist both in determining if a
"taking" has occurred 42 and also in determining if the object of
theft 43 can be classified as "property."
2. Use of Non-Theft Statutes and Statutes Modeled Upon
Traditional Crimes
Other federal and state criminal statutes, including embezzlement," invasion of privacy,45 trade secret,4 copyright, 47 and surprisingly, mail fraud laws, 48 have been used to prosecute computer
crimes. Numerous problems exist in applying these criminal statutes to computer crimes. Shortcomings exist in these laws because
there are gaps in their applicability to computer crimes and because
some are subject to specific defenses. For example, in cases of embezzlement, if no property or money is converted, the criminal
charge cannot be maintained. 49 Similarly, a trade secret theft
charge is subject to the defense of "unprotected disclosure" if the
computer trade secret owner failed to take reasonable precautions
to protect the secrecy of the thing allegedly stolen.5 0 The applicability of this defense is particularly appropriate in computer situations
since often many employees are privy to the computer and its
programs.
Some prosecutors and judges, who have specific computer crime
statutes at their disposal, are reluctant to apply them to computer
41.

A. BEQUAi, supra note 4, at 39.

42. Roddy, supra note 20.
43. Sokolik, supra note 6, at 376.
44. A. BEQUAi, supra note 4, at 31.

45. For a list of federal and state privacy legislation passed as of 1977, see Nycum,
Legal Problems of Computer Abuse, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 527, 533 nn.11 & 12. See also
Tunick, supra note 14, at 335 (discussing common law and statutory privacy law in a
computer crime context).
46. See 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976) (theft of trade secrets by federal employees);
Stamicarbon, N.V. v. American Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d 532, 540 n.1l (2d Cir. 1974)
(complete list of state trade secret statutes).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1976) (federal copyright law). See generally Lahore, supra
note 16 (discussing copyright problems with computer programs); see also Tunick,
supra note 14, at 345 (using copyright laws for protection of computer software is an
area of considerable dispute).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1952) (federal mail fraud statute); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1952)
(wire fraud statute).
49. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
50. Hedden, Intellectual Property, 6 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 679, 688 (1975); see
supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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abuses because the statutes are simply variations on larceny or
damage to property statutes.5 Absent the determination of the
value of stolen or damaged software, or absent evidence of the computer abuser's fraudulent intent, criminal prosecutions under many
state computer crime statutes are cumbersome, if not impossible to
implement. 5 2 As discussed above, 53 these computer crime statutes
are applicable only if the property is damaged or taken and a value
is placed on the damage or loss. For example, Virginia's computer
crime statute explicitly describes computer services or data programs as items capable of being stolen, and therefore puts computer
54
theft within the purview of the general larceny statute.
II.

BEYOND THE USE OF CONVENTIONAL CRIMINAL
CONCEPTS: COMPUTER CRIME ACTS

Federal and state legislators have attempted to incorporate categories of computer abuses into computer crime acts. Use of these
acts is an alternative to prosecuting computer abuse under conventional criminal statutes. For example, some statutes have
criminalized many aspects of computer abuse such as theft of tele55
communication services.
A.

LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH COMPUTER ABUSE

One of the forerunners of computer crime legislation was Senate Bill 1766, the Federal Computer Systems Protection Act of
1977.56 Two years later, Senator Abraham Ribicoff sponsored Senate
Bill 240, 57 which was virtually identical to its predecessor. Senate
Bill 240 set forth penalties for using computers to defraud and steal
from the United States government, financial institutions and other
entities related to interstate commerce. It contained a broad definition of "computer" and a definition of property that included in51. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
52. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
54. VA. CODE §§ 18.2-98.1 (Supp. 1981).
55. For a complete listing, see generally Lautsch, Digest and Analysis of State
Legislation Relating to Computer Technology, 20 JURIMETRICS J. 201 (Spring 1980).
56. S. 1766 was introduced by Senator Abraham Ribicoff in the Ninety-fifth Congress but was not reported out of the Judiciary Committee before the end of the second session. S. 1766, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 21,023-21,025 (daily ed. June
27, 1977).
57. S. 240, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). S. 240, the Federal Computer Systems Protection Act of 1979, was introduced in January 1979 (125 CONG. REC. 1190-1201 (daily
ed. Jan. 25, 1979)) and amended in November 1979 (125 CONG. REc. S. 15901-15902 (November 5, 1979)).
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tangibles. 5 8 Thus, under Senate Bill 240, an individual who damages
a computer intentionally and without authorization would have received a $50,000 fine and five years imprisonment. 59 This bill was defeated because it was overbroad (as in the definition of property)
and because it was difficult to apply it to intangible property. 60 Another bill, sponsored by Representative Nelson, who also authored
Act, 6 1 is presently pending before the
the Florida Computer Crimes
62
House Judiciary Committee.
Many states have passed bills modeled after Senate Bill 240.
Such statutes contain two basic provisions. One provision penalizes
any scheme to defraud by means of false or fraudulent pretenses
through altering or accessing a computer, and a second provision penalizes damaging, destroying, or unauthorized accessing of any comcontain either a "willful" or
puter system. All such statutes
63
"knowing" mens rea requirement.
The major difference among state computer statutes is the classification of a violation as a felony or misdemeanor and the corresponding penalty. Most state computer crime statutes classify the
64
crime according to the value of the property stolen or damaged, as
in most larceny statutes. Depending upon the wording of the statute, the same valuation problems that arise when employing conventional criminal statutes to computer crime may6 5 arise even in
those states with specific computer crime provisions.
Several states with computer crime statutes criminalize the use
of a computer to defraud or deceive by means of false pretenses, regardless of whether the victim incurred a monetary loss. 6 6 Two
states, Arizona and Florida, have enacted statutes that establish
58. S. 240, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) at p. 4, lines 8-13, 21-25, 51-52.
59. See Bigelow, Where Do We Stand on Computer Crime Law?, 6 COMPUTER L. &
TAX REP. 3.

60. For criticism of S. 240, see Becker, Trial of a Computer Crime in the United
States, 131 NEw.L.J. 908; Sokolik, supra note 6, at 380; Comment, Computer Crime,
Senate Bill S. 240, 10 MEM. ST. U.L REV. 660 (1980).
61. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
62. H.R. REP. No. 3970, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 3141 (1981); see Federal Computer
Crime Legislation. Tilting at Windmills, 1 THE ScoTr REPORT, Nov. 1981, at 14 (for
analysis and comment on H.R. 3970).
63. Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Michigan, Rhode Island, and Utah all currently have some version of a computer
crime statute. See Lautsch, supra note 55, at 212.
64. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-102(3) (Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 169(3) (1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.529(7) (Callaghan 1980);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-16A-3(B)(1)-3(B)(3) (Supp. 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6703(1)-703(4) (Supp.1979).
65. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
66. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2316(A) (Supp. 1978); CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(d)
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penalties according to the type of computer misappropriation rather
than according to the value of the loss. 67 Computer crime statutes
in Rhode Island and California do not differentiate penalties on
either basis. Instead these statutes provide uniform penalties for
any transgression falling within their ambit.6 8 Some statutes require that a computer program be stored in a computer system
before it can be the subject of unauthorized use, alteration, damage,
or destruction.6 9 Such provisions provide a loophole for the computer thief who steals a program not yet within the computer
system.
The recent case of New York v. Weg 70 illustrates how computer
crime statutes can be ineffective if they are too narrowly constructed. In Weg, the judge dismissed the theft of services charge
against a computer systems manager employed by the New York
Board of Education, who used the school computers to trace the
genealogy of horses and to create a handicapping system for betting.
The court found that Weg had not stolen computer time because his
supervisor had given him general access to the computer. If Weg
had plugged into a public computer without permission and was trying to avoid payment, his acts may have fallen within the purview of
the statute. The court also noted that though the statute regulates
theft of services from commercial ventures, the Board of Education
is a noncommercial entity.
B.

A

RESPONSIVE STATUTORY APPROACH:

Focus

ON THE ABUSE

The most innovative approach to the computer abuse problem is
the Florida Computer Crimes Act.7 1 It creates two new classifications of computer offenses: an offense against intellectual property
and an offense against the authorized computer user. The first classification provides that whoever willfully, knowingly, and without
authorization, modifies or destroys data, programs, or supporting
documentation, internal or external to a computer, is guilty of a felony against intellectual property. 72 The second offense holds an individual liable for a felony if he, without authorization, denies an
(West Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815.04(4) (b) (West Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN.
30-16A-3(A) (Supp. 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-4 (1979).
67. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 815.04(4) (a), (b), 815.06(2) (a), (b) (West Supp. 1979); ARIZ.

§

REV. STAT. ANN.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

§ 13-2316(A),

(B)

(1978).

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-4 (1979); CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(b) (West Supp. 1981).
E.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-102(2) (Supp. 1981).
No. 2329 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (April 12, 1982).
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 815.01-815.07 (West Supp. 1981).
Id. § 815.04.
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authorized user access to computer system services. 73 This statute
distinguishes misdemeanor and felony crimes on the basis of
whether the offense involves damage, destruction or fraud, whether
the offense results in interruption of government operation of public
services, and whether the amount of damage to the computer or
74
computer system falls within a specific range.
Because it does not index the degree of the criminal charge exclusively to the amount of damage to the computer system, this statute goes beyond the traditional constraints of larceny or
embezzlement statutes. The Florida statute recognizes computer
abuse as a separate criminal activity with a range of degrees and
penalties. By penalizing many types of computer abuses, such as
unauthorized accessing, the statute shifts the focus away from the
harm, the tangibility of the item, or the possession characteristics
inherent in the elements of conventional theft laws.
Admittedly, the statute might be considered overly inclusive, in
which case, prosecutorial discretion and possibly abuse will play a
greater role. But prosecutional abuse is not likely to occur due to
problems prosecutors have had in the past with respect to the
amount of time required to investigate and prepare for a computer
abuse case and to the lack of statutes with which to prosecute the
75
computer abuser effectively.
Florida's statute incorporates the best of both worlds. It retains
the traditional criminal provisions for offenses against computer
equipment or supplies. 76 It also includes provisions that protect in77
tellectual property from modification, destruction, or disclosure
and provisions that protect the individuals who are entitled to access from unauthorized interference with their right to use. Depending on the nature of the offense, the Florida statute allows
prosecution under traditional common law and statutory property
analysis or for tampering with the computer or denying access to an
authorized user. No other computer crime statute is more
comprehensive.
Though the Arizona and California statutes, like the Florida
statute, penalize unauthorized access to a computer or computer
system, these statutes require proof of fraudulent intent or of a
73. Id. § 815.06.
74. See Sokolik, supra note 6, at 382 (summary of Florida's computer crime
statute).
75. Rivlin, supra note 2, at 18. See also A. BEQUAI, supra note 4, at 43-93 (examines inadequacies of procedural, investigatory, and legislative processes in dealing
with computer crime).
76. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815.05 (West Supp. 1981).
77. Id. § 815.04.
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scheme to defraud. 78 if there is no such proof, the Arizona statute
provides for a lesser penalty, while the California statute requires
79
that the unauthorized access be malicious.
Florida's statute is not flawless. For example, the statute's language may be used to convict an individual of a felony for stealing a
digital watch with a built-in calendar or for using a computer to
print a Snoopy calendar. 80 If the law focuses on the occurrence of
the abuse, rather than on the degree of harm, then a felony prosecution in either case is entirely possible.
III.

CONCLUSION

Present laws are inadequate to combat computer abuse. The
computer age has opened doors to permit an array of criminal activity never before contemplated. New legislation is needed to avoid
fitting a new type of misdeed into the all-purpose coat of the conventional cloth. In distinguishing felonies from misdemeanors, computer crime legislation should focus on the abusive acts of the
computer criminal rather than on the amount of damage to the computer system.
Pamela Gonzalez

78. ARIZ.

REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 13-2316(A) (1978);

CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 502(b) (West

Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815.06 (West Supp. 1981).
79. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(c) (West Supp. 1981).
80. See Bigelow, supra note 59, at 3-4. See also Rivlin, supra note 2, at 36.

